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ABSTRACT
This applied dissertation offered insights about the scientist-practitioner gap and
examined the process of organizational decision making using a real case from a large
United States manufacturing company. Historical records of employee work hours were
extracted and compiled from several of the company's databases, along with recent plant
performance metrics. These archival data were used to evaluate the relationship between
the percentage of each plant's population working overtime (i.e., overtime utilization) and
each plant’s performance on various manufacturing metrics. This comparison was made
using a median split approach, such that the performance of plants with an overtime
utilization above the median (i.e., the high-overtime group) was compared to the
performance of pants with an overtime utilization falling below the median (i.e., the lowovertime group).
Post-hoc analyses were conducted to determine if a more rigorous methodological
approach would have produced different findings. As such, a series of bivariate
regressions (with overtime utilization as the predictor variable) was conducted, allowing
the overtime variability that exists across plants to be taken into account in order to better
understand the relationship between overtime utilization and the outcome metrics.
Additionally, when available, financial metrics were leveraged instead of performance
metrics so that results could be interpreted through the lens of the company’s bottom line.
Ultimately, the more rigorous approach produced richer insights regarding how risky the
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decision to enact an overtime-reduction policy might be from a financial perspective and
exemplified the value of leveraging confidence intervals to guide organizational decision
making.

APPROVAL FOR SCHOLARLY DISSEMINATION
The author grants to the Prescott Memorial Library of Louisiana Tech University
the right to reproduce, by appropriate methods, upon request, any or all portions of this
Dissertation. It was understood that “proper request” consists of the agreement, on the part
of the requesting party, that said reproduction is for his personal use and that subsequent
reproduction will not occur without written approval of the author of this Dissertation.
Further, any portions of the Dissertation used in books, papers, and other works must be
appropriately referenced to this Dissertation.
Finally, the author of this Dissertation reserves the right to publish freely, in the
literature, at any time, any or all portions of this Dissertation.
Author_____________________________
Date _____________________________

G.S. Form 14
(5/03)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii
APPROVAL FOR SCHOLARLY DISSEMINATION ......................................................v
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1
The Scientist-Practitioner Gap .......................................................................................2
Why the Gap Exists .................................................................................................3
Proposals to Bridge the Gap ....................................................................................4
Conducting Research in Real-World Organizations ......................................................7
Overtime ......................................................................................................................16
Work Hour Trends and Overtime in the United States ..........................................16
Implications of Long Work Hours .........................................................................17
Motivation to Work Long Hours ...........................................................................28
Present Study ...............................................................................................................31
CHAPTER 2 ORIGINAL PROJECT SUMMARY ..........................................................35
Participants ...................................................................................................................35
Procedure .....................................................................................................................35
Measures ................................................................................................................38

vi

vii
Hypotheses .............................................................................................................39
Results .........................................................................................................................41
Business Outcome ........................................................................................................42
CHAPTER 3 POST HOC ANALYSIS SUMMARY ........................................................44
Procedure .....................................................................................................................44
Financial Implications ............................................................................................45
Leveraging Confidence Intervals to Examine Level of Risk. ..........................46
Results ..........................................................................................................................48
Assumptions...........................................................................................................48
Hypothesis 1...........................................................................................................49
Hypothesis 2...........................................................................................................52
Hypotheses 3-4.......................................................................................................55
Department-Level Analysis .............................................................................58
Hypotheses 5 ..........................................................................................................60
Plant-Level Analysis ........................................................................................61
Department-Level Analysis .............................................................................63
CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................68
More Data Points Are Better than Fewer Data Points .................................................69
Confidence Intervals Are a Useful Tool for Decision-Making ...................................69
Do Not Forget about Outliers ......................................................................................70
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................71
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................73

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Calculation of Plant X’s 60-Hour Overtime Utilization......................................37
Table 2. Median Split of Low- and High-Overtime Plants ................................................37
Table 3. Performance Across Low- and High-Overtime Groups ......................................41
Table 4. Confidence Intervals for Hypothesis 1.................................................................33
Table 5. Confidence Intervals for Hypothesis 2.................................................................34
Table 6. Confidence Intervals for Hypotheses 3-4: Plant-Level Analysis .........................35
Table 7. Confidence Intervals for Hypotheses 3-4: Department-Level Analysis...............38
Table 8. Confidence Intervals for Hypothesis 5: Plant-Level Analysis .............................63
Table 9. Confidence Intervals for Hypothesis 5: Department-Level Analysis...................66
Table 10. Cost Implications for Enactment of Overtime Reduction Policy .......................67

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual for H1 ......................50

Figure 2 Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted
Values for H1 .....................................................................................................................50
Figure 3

Normal P-P Plot for H2 ..................................................................................53

Figure 4 Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted
Values for H2. ....................................................................................................................53
Figure 5

Normal P-P Plot for H3-4 (Plant-Level).........................................................56

Figure 6 Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted
Values for H3-4 (Plant-Level) ...........................................................................................56
Figure 7

Normal P-P Plot for H3-4 (Department-Level) ..............................................59

Figure 8 Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted
Values for H3-4 (Department-Level).................................................................................59
Figure 9

Normal P-P Plot for H5 (Plant-Level). ...........................................................61

Figure 10 Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted
Values for H5 (Plant-Level)...............................................................................................62
Figure 11 Normal P-P Plot for H5 (Department-Level). ................................................64
Figure 12 Original Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized
Predicted Values for H5 (Department-Level) ....................................................................64
Figure 13 Log Transformation Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs.
Standardized Predicted Values for H5 (Department-Level). .............................................65
Figure 14 Square Root Transformation Scatterplot of Standardized
Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted Values for H5 (Department-Level). .......................65

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are so many people who I’d like to thank for making the completion of my
doctorate possible. First, I’d like to thank my dissertation committee. Their wisdom,
guidance, and (many) edits challenged and transformed my thinking about this project for
the better and ultimately enabled me to make what was once only a dream, a reality. Most
of all, I want to thank my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Tilman Sheets, for seeing my
potential as an eager but nervous college graduate in 2014, taking me under his wing,
teaching me to get comfortable with ambiguity, and guiding me through my graduate
school journey; and of course for all of the time, energy, and brain power he put into this
dissertation. I absolutely could not have done this without him.
I’d also like to thank my family and friends for their continuous support and
optimism that at some point, I would eventually, finally, earn my PhD, especially during
the times I wasn’t quite convinced of that myself. I absolutely would not be Dr. Olivia
Reinecke without my incredible parents, who raised me with a strong work ethic and a
deep, internal knowing that I could accomplish anything I set my mind to, even if it was
way more difficult than I anticipated. I would also be remiss if I didn’t thank Samantha
and Milo their unwavering support (via puppy snuggles and wet kisses) and barks of
encouragement throughout this process. Without them, dissertation writing would have
been so much more agonizing.

x

xi
And finally, to my best friend and husband Seth: thank you for being my number
one cheerleader both personally and professionally, for continuously pushing me,
inspiring me, and motivating me throughout college, graduate school, and beyond, for
calling me out on my procrastination antics and forcing me to write when it was the last
thing I wanted to do, and for ultimately molding me into the woman I am today. I love
you.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Organizations are messy, complex, and volatile entities, and the imperfect data
they produce reflect this reality. Using those data to generate meaningful, relevant
insights that are understood and implemented by organizational decision-makers is a key
component (and challenge) of successfully practicing industrial-organizational (I-O)
psychology. This challenge fits squarely within the ever-relevant, decades-old topic of
the scientist-practitioner gap, a term used to describe the disconnect between the
academics who publish research about organizations and the practitioners who operate
within them (Aguinis et al., 2017; Dunnette, 1990). As described by Rupp and Beal
(2007), the scientist-practitioner model that I-O psychology subscribes to entails a
reciprocal relationship, where “practitioners should look to the scientific literature for
guidance on setting up effective workplace systems; scientists should take their cues from
practitioners in identifying issues relevant to employee well-being and organizational
effectiveness” (p. 36). While this concept may seem straightforward at first glance, Rupp
and Beal (2007) acknowledge that bringing the scientist-practitioner model to life is
easier said than done, and as such, the challenges inherent to the model have been
fiercely debated within the I-O community.
This applied dissertation will add to the conversation by taking a reflective
approach on a real-world business project that sought to better understand the relationship
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between working overtime hours and several key metrics at a United States
manufacturing company in an effort to provide insights focused on making key policy
decisions. In addition to providing insight on how overtime hours might impact key
business metrics, this project also offered an opportunity to perhaps better understand the
scientist-practitioner gap in a real-world, business problem, as well as an opportunity to
determine if a more rigorous, scientific approach would have produced different findings.

The Scientist-Practitioner Gap
The scientist-practitioner gap is nothing new. Consider this quote from Susman
and Evered dating back to 1978:
There is a crisis in the field of organizational science. The principal symptom of
this crisis is that as our research methods and techniques have become more
sophisticated, they have also become increasingly less useful for solving the
practical problems that members of organizations face. (p. 582)
While the principle symptom may have changed over the years and today might
be more related to the sophistication of statistical methods and techniques, the struggle to
come to terms with scientist-practitioner differences is not new. More recent commentary
on the topic (e.g., Bansal et al., 2012; Cascio, 2008; Cascio & Aguinis, 2008; Halfhill &
Huff, 2003; Ones et al., 2017; Rotolo et al., 2018; Rynes et al., 2002) suggests the gap is
still alive and well. It is also worth noting that the notion of a disconnect between science
and practice is not unique to I-O psychology, or even psychology alone for that matter
(Belli, 2010; Rotolo et al., 2018). As pointed out by Rynes et al. (2001), a sciencepractice gap is evident in “nearly all fields in which there are both researchers and
practitioners” (p. 340).

3
Why the Gap Exists
Much has been written about why the science-practice gap exists in organizational
science. An early theoretical rationale for the gap was presented by Shrivastava and
Mitroff (1984), who argue that researchers and practitioners possess markedly different
frames of reference and therefore make different assumptions about what constitutes
useful knowledge. From this perspective, well-meaning researchers are doing their best to
produce relevant research that practitioners will find valuable and easy to apply, but they
see the world differently than their practitioner counterparts and therefore, their best
efforts fall short. Johns (1993) approaches the gap from a slightly different perspective,
focusing on organizations’ tendency to adopt (or not) personnel innovations advocated by
I-O psychology. In Johns’ view, whether organizations choose to adopt I-O’s technicallymeritorious practices depends on three things: (1) managers’ technical orientation – for
example, they consider personnel processes (e.g., selection and assessment) as
administrative, rather than technical practices and therefore do not believe technicallysound, psychologically-based methods are necessary; (2) the nature of I-O theory and
research, in that it is technically oriented, involves long causal chains, and typically fails
to address the larger organizational context; and (3) the external environment, which
powerfully shapes how organizations operate, including politics, government regulation,
crises, and competing sources of innovative solutions.
More recently, Banks et al. (2016) suggested that the science-practice gap stems
from three issues: (1) a transfer problem: scientific knowledge in the format of scholarly
articles is not easily available to or understood by practitioners; (2) a collaboration
problem: theory and practice are developed in isolation of each other, as research
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partnerships between academics and practitioners are scarce; (3) a relevance problem: the
research topics pursued by academics are not useful for practice. Yet another perspective
is offered by Ones et al. (2017), who argue that a number of “troubling trends” in I-O
psychology are fueling the science-practice gap and hurting the discipline overall: “an
overemphasis on theory; a proliferation of, and fixation on, trivial methodological
minutiae; a suppression of exploration and repression of innovation; an unhealthy
obsession with publication while ignoring practical issues; a tendency to be distracted by
fads; and a growing habit of losing real-world influence to fields” (para. 4).
A final perspective worth discussing is that of Olenick et al. (2018). They built on
the typology of organizational psychologists originally proposed by Rupp and Beal
(2007; i.e., the pure scientist, the scientist-practitioner, the practitioner-scientist, the pure
practitioner) and propose that each of these roles operates in different environments that
are impacted by different systemic pressures and disconnected incentive structures —
publication standards and tenure systems for pure scientists and scientist-practitioners,
and the need to add value to organizations for practitioner-scientists and pure
practitioners — regardless of the personal motivations each group possesses.
Proposals to Bridge the Gap
Clearly, the existence of the science-practitioner gap is due to a myriad of
complex and interwoven factors; as such, a variety of solutions have been proposed to
bridge the gap. An early theory, called the different-frames-of-reference theory, was
offered by Shrivastava and Mitroff (1984) as a means to understand and close the
science-practice gap. They propose that organizational researchers have much to learn
from their practitioner counterparts in terms of how to develop truly useful research. As
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such, they recommend researchers put less emphasis on perfectly controllable variables
and linear causal relationships. Instead, researchers should employ more clinical and
qualitative research methods and expand the scope of their research topics to those that
make sense to managers and are perceived as actionable. Mohrman et al. (2001) also
propose that researchers shift the way they conduct research so that it is more useful to
practitioners. Their findings using an extensive qualitative research design suggest that
practitioners consider research results most useful when: (a) the research offers
opportunities for joint interpretative forums (e.g., practitioners are invited to interact and
collaborate with researchers) and (b) the results can be used to inform self-design
activities (i.e., the behavioral and cognitive processes used by employees to reorganize
and redesign their organizations). Focusing on a different potential cause for the gap,
Cascio (2008) and Cascio and Aguinis (2008) argue that without the modification of
academic reward systems, the science-practice gap will remain ajar; like others before
him (e.g., Mohrman et al., 2001; Münsterberg, 1913; Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1984),
Cascio (2008) highlights the need for closer collaboration between researchers and
practitioners so that academic research topics are congruent with real-world business
problems.
However, as pointed out by Rynes et al. (2002), it is important to recognize that
failure to implement scholarly research can occur for a variety of reasons, not necessarily
due to the research itself. Their thinking is congruent with Johns (1993), as both articles
suggest that organizational factors play a powerful role. Rynes et al. (2002) believe that
factors such as organizational politics, risk aversion, lack of bandwidth, and
organizational inertia can contribute to the scientist-practitioner gap, rather than the
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translation/knowing gap proposed by other researchers (e.g., Banks et al., 2016). To test
their proposition that lack of implementation results from a lack of doing rather than a
lack of knowing, Rynes et al. (2002) surveyed 5,000 human resource (HR) professionals
about the extent to which they agreed with various research findings. Their findings did
not support their original proposition, as results showed substantial variance in
knowledge of HR best practices across HR professionals employed by different
companies. They also acknowledged that their sample may have underrepresented this
variance, as they surveyed more senior HR leaders who could possess more knowledge
than their less experienced counterparts; additionally, non-respondents may also be likely
to possess less HR knowledge. The biggest gaps between research knowledge and realworld practice existed for selection and engagement practices. As a result of their
findings, Rynes et al. (2002) recommend that researchers work to publish more of their
research content, particularly with regard to best practices, in formats commonly
consumed by HR managers (e.g., SHRM, HR Magazine).
Another perspective worth considering is that of Bansal et al. (2012), who make
up a balanced mix of researchers and practitioners. Upon reflection of their own
experiences collaborating with both sides of the scientist-practitioner continuum, they
argue that the relationship between research and practice is too muddied with
complexities and paradoxes to easily bridge the two worlds. Instead, they advocate for
intermediary organizations such as the Network for Business Sustainability, an
organization founded in 2005 to facilitate the transfer of knowledge on business
sustainability between researchers and practitioners. The organization has accomplished
quite a lot since its inception, including the publication of over 100 research briefs on the

7
topic of business sustainability that practitioners can understand and leverage. This was
achieved through a formal process; each year, ten of the most pressing research questions
in business sustainability are identified, and then research teams are created to
systematically review the research related to these questions, with a focus on
incorporating both scientific and practitioner perspectives. The research team then
synthesizes and publishes this research into briefs specifically targeted for a practitioner
audience.
While some experts argue progress has been made and the science-practice gap is
beginning to shrink (e.g., Aguinis et al., 2017; Latham, 2001), others argue it is
continuing to grow (e.g., Hulin, 2001; Ones et al., 2017). This applied dissertation will
contribute to the discussion by examining a real-world business problem, which involved
many of the organizational factors discussed by Rynes et al. (2002) such as
organizational inertia, lack of bandwidth, and organizational politics.

Conducting Research in Real-World Organizations
Boehm (1980) argues that the traditional model of scientific inquiry (i.e., the
scientific method), which is based on research practices conducted in the physical
sciences, has limited the progress and utility of applied I-O psychology research. In her
experience working for The Standard Oil Company (Ohio), “when attempts are made to
utilize this model in ‘real world’ settings (as in-house I/O psychologists or as consultants
to organizations), it very rapidly becomes apparent that there is a disparity between the
‘state of the science’ in I/O psychology and the ‘state of the art’ regarding application of
behavioral science principles to organizational reality” (p. 497). She also notes that the
typical reaction of scientists when they encounter the realities of an organizational
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research environment is to either attempt to modify the environment to better fit the
traditional model of scientific inquiry (anyone who has worked inside an organization
knows this is near impossible), or to opt out altogether. Neither option bodes well for the
progression of scientific research or the betterment of organizations.
As such, Boehm (1980) proposes an alternative model that she considers to be a
better fit for the realities of real-world organizational research, a model that embraces the
complexity of organizations rather than trying to change or avoid them. Boehm’s (1980)
model looks quite different from the traditional scientific method, as it begins with an
organizational problem that creates concern or unrest, and then requires an investigation
of the organizational context and restraints surrounding the research. It also includes the
question, “Are results valuable to the organization?” to determine the utility and overall
success of the research (p. 498). If yes, results are reported and then pitched or sold to
business leaders, again taking into account organizational context and restraints, and
ultimately implemented. Boehm (1980), in describing her organizational research model,
points out that though it is “scientifically, distinctly messy in terms of methodology,
complexity, statistical analysis, and the conclusions can be drawn… it seems to present a
more accurate picture of organizational reality than a model based on what should be” (p.
497).
Boehm (1980) notes three key differences between the traditional, what should be
scientific research model and her proposed, what is organizational research model; as
compared to the traditional scientific model, the Boehm’s model: (1) contains far more
processes/steps; (2) involves more interactions between steps; and (3) originates from a
different need – that is, a need to solve a current or anticipated performance problem,
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rather than a decontextualized “scientific quest to learn what the facts are” (p. 497). All in
all, this model grants a great deal of flexibility, allowing one to embrace organizational
messiness and complexity rather than trying to modify, refine, or dismiss it.
In addition to proposing a new model for organizational research, Boehm (1980)
calls for a change in how organizational research is evaluated by those in the scientific
community. If one views the research conducted inside of organizations through the lens
of the traditional scientific method, it is indeed methodologically flawed: “real world
research is messy – uncontrolled variables abound, predictor and criterion measures
interact, alternative hypotheses cannot be ruled out; standard statistical procedures cannot
be applied without massive violation of assumptions” (Boehm, 1980, p.499). And yet,
these flaws are an accurate reflection of the organization’s environment. As such, Boehm
(1980) argues that these “flaws” should be considered necessary and even desirable when
conducting research that can be realistically applied to real-world organizations. Further,
she laments the sparsity in the published organizational literature describing these
methodological difficulties and the reality of real-world research.
Even in 2021, published research on this topic is still scarce. As such, one of the
objectives of this applied dissertation is to candidly describe the challenges this project’s
research team faced, rather than glossing over them, in addition to reflecting upon what
would have been different if a more rigorous methodology had been applied. Boehm
(1980) concludes her discussion with a warning:
Organizations do not exist primarily as research laboratories for behavioral
scientists. If this basic fact of life is recognized and a model based on “what is” is
accepted as being as equally legitimate as the model of “what should be” there are
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exciting possibilities for the advancement of I/O psychology, both scientifically
and empirically. If, however, I/O psychologists continue to adhere solely to a
model based on the ideal, in which organizational realities are viewed solely as
problems to be circumvented, stagnation of the field is a strong possibility, and
widening of the communications gap between academic and organizational I/O
psychologists a virtual certainty. (pp. 502-503)
Daft (1983) echoes many of the arguments made by Boehm (1980), calling
organizational research a craft rather than a precise science. He explains that, after
graduate school, many practitioners recognize that the research techniques they learned
are insufficient for conducting research in real-world organizations. Instead, Daft (1983)
recommends learning to practice what he calls “research craftsmanship,” which is a
significant departure from the “formal, prescriptive approach to research that is
frequently taught in graduate school” (p. 540). For example, Daft (1983) recommends
that those conducting research in organizations “build in plenty of room for error and
surprise” (p. 540); he believes that hard logic and previous evidence should not always be
required to justify organizational research hypotheses. In his view, the most informative
research to-date has approached an organizational problem with an open-ended question
to be answered, rather than with specific hypotheses. He argues against the notion that
successful research must include hypotheses justified by previous research and provide
predictable results, as this can restrict the discovery of knowledge. Instead, Daft (1983)
advocates for asking research questions without having the answer in advance. He boldly
states, “If experiments are perfectly designed and the results come out as expected, then
they probably are a waste of time” (p. 541).
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Daft (1983) also promotes simplicity, arguing that good research does not try to
answer all possible questions about a given issue. Instead, “the best research provides an
utterly imperfect model of organizational reality” that explains “a tiny piece of
organizational reality… [that] can be used to raise new questions for future research” (p.
542). Much like Boehm (1980), Daft (1983) describes the decision processes involved in
research craftsmanship as non-linear, random, and messy. Organizational researchers
must expect and embrace this.
A more recent discussion on this topic is offered by Swanson and Holton (2005),
who in the first chapter of their book Research in Organizations: Foundations and
Methods of Inquiry discuss the intentionality of the book’s title, highlighting the
distinction between conducting research on organizations as compared to in
organizations. Throughout the book, they emphasize that conducting effective research in
organizations requires traditional research methods to be adapted and modified to fit
organizational realities. In their discussion of the challenges inherent to conducting
research in organizations, Swanson and Holton (2005) urge researchers to recognize that
organizations are complex, open, and dynamic systems that exist alongside other,
external systems and serve as hosts for a number of behavioral phenomena. While these
characteristics make organizations fascinating settings for research, they also make them
messy and multifaceted, which makes conducting research inside them all the more
difficult. As a result, Swanson and Holton (2005) argue that conducting research in
organizations requires “harmony or logical trade-offs among the chosen research
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question, research paradigm, research method, and research context. These considerations
are not linear, and tentative decisions in one realm will influence the other three realms”
(p. 24).
So, it is clear that conducting research in organizations departs substantially from
the traditional research model prescribed as the gold standard for science. Indeed, StoneRomero (2011) describes randomized experimental design as the ideal research
methodology and argues that there is “no reason [emphasis added] why such research
cannot be conducted using traditional, rigorous research methods” (p. 48). However, she
later points out a few potential reasons, acknowledging that conducting research within
any organization requires support from senior leadership. She further explains that “it is
typically the case that managers are very reluctant to allow experimental research to be
conducted in their organizations. In addition, a host of other factors militate against the
conduct of randomized experiments in organizations (p. 48).
While the previously discussed sources provide a high-level overview of the
challenges inherent to conducting organizational research, it is also helpful to understand
the specific limitations organizational researchers encounter in their research. Brutus et
al. (2010) examined this systematically, conducting a content analysis of the self-reported
limitations reported in 1,903 empirical articles published by the Journal of Applied
Psychology, Personnel Psychology, and the Academy of Management Journal between
1995 and 2008. Overall, 75% of the articles they examined mentioned at least one
limitation. The most common were: threats to internal validity (41% of articles), due to
an inability to infer causality (21%) and inability to measure an important variable (19%);
threats to construct validity (38%), caused by less than ideal operationalization of
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constructs (17%) and common-method variance (16%); and threats to external validity
(36%), due to an inability to generalize across people (21%).
Brutus et al. (2010) also examined the relationship between study limitations and
methodological choices using phi coefficients. Not surprisingly, their results indicate that
research methods more easily employed in organizations – surveys, observation, and the
use of archival data – were more likely to suffer from limitations regarding inability to
infer causality. Specifically, their results show that studies using survey methodology
were positively linked to limitations due to common-method variance and lack of
causality; while survey research was negatively related to limitations due to
generalizability across situations. Archival data was negatively related to statisticalconclusion validity threats, and observation was linked to low power. Experimental
research, a method less commonly leveraged in organizations (Mitchell, 1985; StoneRomero, 2011) and one that accounted for less than 20% of studies in this sample, was
positively linked to limitations concerning generalizability across situations, but
negatively linked to lack of causality. Interestingly, their results also show that threats to
external validity decreased over time, while threats to statistical validity increased. They
saw no changes in the frequency of internal or construct validity limitations. Overall, the
results of Brutus et al. (2010) show that a fairly narrow set of (reported) limitations occur
in I-O psychology. Of the 36 discrete threats to validity that were studied, only 5
accounted for half of all limitations observed: causality, omission of an important
variable, less than ideal operationalization of constructs, common-method variance, and
generalizing across people.
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These findings are echoed by previous discussions on the validity threats
commonly encountered in organizational research. Mitchell (1985), for example,
reviewed a sample of 126 empirical articles published between 1979 and 1983 in the
Journal of Applied Psychology, the Academy of Management Journal, and the
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance journal. She describes her findings as
“unsettling” (p. 201), as they showed that most cross-sectional, correlational studies
administered a questionnaire to a convenience sample without reporting response rates or
exploring the differences between respondents and non-respondents. Further, reliability
and validity coefficients were weak, with construct validity rarely checked. While
researchers were aware of and sensitive to the threat of common-method variance, crossvalidation efforts or the use of holdout samples was virtually nonexistent.
When considering what lead to these unsettling results, Mitchell (1985) suggests
the “notion of applied versus basic research” could be part of the problem, as “the field
researcher often is more interested in simply showing that some variable (e.g., goal
setting) correlates with performance than in demonstrating that the goal setting measure
really reflects the goal setting construct… Thus, if it works, no matter what the reason,
the result is important from an applied perspective” (p. 202). Clearly, the tension between
what is deemed as acceptable in traditional research as compared to that of the applied
world is evident here.
Highhouse (2009) offers a different rationale for practitioners’ research methods.
He believes that experimental research is not conducted within organizations due to
external validity concerns and instead argues that “organizational research has relied too
heavily on methods characterized by passive observation, likely because there is a
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widespread belief that experimental research has limited generalizability. However, this
is often because researchers (and reviewers or editors) misunderstand the nature of
generalizability and what it requires” (p. 554). While this may be true for researchers on
the scientist side of the scientist-practitioner continuum, practitioners likely have other,
more organizational-specific reasons for avoiding experimental research. Highhouse
(2009) does not appear to acknowledge that there are other reasons organizational
researchers choose not to conduct experimental research, such as those mentioned by
Stone-Romero (2011; e.g., lack of management support).
Grant and Wall (2009) note that true field experiments overcome the external
validity concerns associated with laboratory experiments, as they maintain fidelity of the
employees and organizational phenomena of interest. And yet, they also recognize that
maximizing internal validity in these studies requires random assignment and the
deliberate manipulation of some variable, both of which can be difficult to accomplish in
the field. Even so, when random assignment and deliberate manipulation exist in
organizational research, they have the capacity to alter the nature of the phenomena under
study and compromise the authenticity of the independent variable, thereby undermining
the study’s external validity. Grant and Wall (2009) postulate that two primary obstacles
stand in the way of conducting true field experiments in real-world organizations:
(1) inability to control random assignment to treatment conditions; and (2) inability to
control key variables of interest including tenure, team composition and diversity, and
human resource practices. They also note that even in cases where these variables can be
controlled by the researcher, “organizations do not hold still, making it difficult for
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researchers to isolate key causal factors and rule out alternative explanations for changes
observed” (p. 654).
The discussion above makes it clear that conducting research inside organizations
is challenging and messy, to say the least. When viewed through the lens of the
traditional scientific method, which remains the gold standard for many scientists,
organizational research is admittedly imperfect. And yet, as others have described and as
this paper will showcase, this imperfection is reality. As noted by Boehm (1980),
organizations exist independently from behavioral science; they were not created as
research laboratories. And yet, we must conduct organizational research anyway, even if
it is imperfect. So rather than harping on the methodological flaws and limitations of this
research, science-practitioners must recognize and accept that organizations and their
data are messy. As a result, organizational research will reflect that messiness. This is
precisely what makes the findings of such research important, relevant, and useful for
practice.
Overtime
Work Hour Trends and Overtime in the United States
Throughout the early twentieth century, there was much debate on the appropriate
workweek length and hourly pay for United States employees. This debate culminated in
the passing of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which mandated a maximum
workweek of 40 hours, with any hours worked beyond this maximum requiring time-anda-half pay (Elder & Miller, 1979). In 2019, the average number of hours worked each
week across all United States employees fell well below this maximum, at 34.4 hours
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). However, this number is higher for manufacturing
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employees, which make up the key population in the present study. The number of hours
worked each week by US manufacturing employees has steadily increased over the past
decade, with an average of 39.0 hours in 2009 versus an average of 40.6 hours per week
in 2019 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020).
Implications of Long Work Hours
Before presenting research findings regarding the impacts of long work hours and
overtime, it is important to discuss the requirements of making causal inferences (i.e., the
ability to conclude that working a certain number of hours legitimately causes a given
outcome). According to Cook and Campbell (1979), three conditions must be present to
conclude causation: (1) temporal precedence, meaning the cause must precede the effect;
(2) covariation of cause and effect, meaning when the cause is present, the effect occurs;
and (3) elimination of alternative explanations. These conditions are clearly met via
randomized experimental design; however, as previously stated, experimental studies are
difficult to conduct in organizations (Grant & Wall, 2009; Stone-Romero, 2011). As
such, true experimental research regarding the causal impacts of overtime in
organizations is rare.
In the late twentieth century, Spurgeon et al. (1997) reviewed the empirical
evidence on working hours and employee safety available at that time. They identified
several gaps in the literature, noting that very few health outcomes beyond cardiovascular
disease and mental health had been examined and that most research studied employees
working more than fifty hours per week. Knowledge of the potential impacts of working
fewer than that were largely unknown at that time. Spurgeon et al. (1997) concluded that
although sufficient evidence existed to merit some concern about the negative health and
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safety impacts of long work hours, additional research was needed “to define the level
and nature of those risks” (p. 367).
In the same year, Sparks et al. (1997) conducted the first meta-analysis of the
research to-date on work hours and employee health. They found a statistically
significant correlation of .1302 (considered a small effect size; Cohen, 1992) between
employee health (psychological and physiological) and work hours, also noting the need
for additional research in this area. A few years later, van der Hulst (2003) conducted a
systematic review of 27 empirical studies on the relationship between long work hours
and health. Examining both physiological recovery and behavioral lifestyle mechanisms
that could explain the hours-health relationship, her review showed support for a modest
relationship between long work hours and adverse health outcomes such as
cardiovascular disease, type two diabetes, disability-related retirement, as well as
subjective reports of poor physical health and fatigue. Her review also provided limited
support for two causal pathways that could explain the relationship between long work
hours and adverse health: (a) insufficient time for physiological recovery and
(b) unhealthy lifestyle behaviors such as smoking, coffee and alcohol consumption, poor
diet, and lack of exercise. However, she ultimately deemed her results as inclusive due to
a number of potential confounding variables that were not controlled, as well as several
studies showing nonsignificant effects.
As noted by Allen et al. (2007), many work hour studies largely ignore the
individual characteristics (e.g., health status, job type, compensation type) of the
employees studied. The practical utility of work hour research is further limited because
studies often include a select sample of employees within a specific industry, focus on a
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narrow subset of risk factors, and/or define long hours inconsistently (Caruso, et al.,
2006). As a result, organizations can find it difficult to leverage this research to determine
sensible, data-driven limits on the number of hours employees should be allowed to work
or even the particular circumstances that pose excessive risk to employees. Some
organizations have taken matters into their own hands, conducting internal research to
investigate the relationship between hours worked and key metrics (e.g., injuries, worker
productivity). For example, Shepard and Clifton (2000) discuss a study conducted by the
Kellogg Company in the 1930s. The company reduced work hours to a maximum of six
per day and saw an increase in productivity, as well as improvements in employee morale
and decreases in accidents and insurance costs.
In a more recent example, the International Truck and Engine Corporation
(ITEC), a heavy machinery manufacturer, partnered with health and safety experts from
the United Auto Workers and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to
better understand the relationship between long work hours and various health and safety
outcomes in their workforce. While designing this study, Allen et al. (2007) lament the
lack of methodological rigor of previous overtime research and set out to provide a more
substantial basis for making causal claims about the true impact of overtime. One way
they do this is by controlling for employees’ prior health status, including medical
conditions, health risks, and prior work injuries. Additionally, their analyses explored not
only the direct effects of work hours on various outcome measures, but also the potential
for work hours to mediate the relationship between various antecedent characteristics and
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outcomes. They then compared the strength of these direct and indirect effects to the
direct effect between the antecedent characteristics and outcomes, bypassing work hours
altogether.
Their results showed that the likelihood of an employee experiencing an adverse
event (e.g., work-related injury) after working long hours varied substantially based on
employee characteristics such as prior work injuries and illnesses, health risks such as
smoking and being overweight, type of compensation/work (hourly vs. salary), and age.
For example, working long hours (in this case, more than 48 per week) was related to a
higher likelihood of injury for hourly males with a history of disease and short-term
disability episodes. Similarly, working long hours (more than 60 hours per week) was
linked to greater odds of new disease onset for older employees with a history of at least
one medical condition. They note, “all of the direct and indirect effects involving
workhours [sic] considered together were overwhelmed by the combined contribution of
the direct effects associated with the prior (non-work related) health, job and
demographic characteristics alone” (p. 165).
In another manufacturing-specific study, Shepard and Clifton (2000) examined
the relationship between overtime hours and employee productivity using aggregate panel
data across 18 United States manufacturing industries from 1956 through 1991. Using a
factor-augmented production function model, the researchers showed that overall,
overtime was linked to lower productivity, with the model indicating that a 10% increase
in overtime hours was related to 2-4% lower productivity, on average. However, their
results varied substantially by industry, even in cases where different industries exhibited
similar trends in average weekly work hours and overtime usage. For example,
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companies in the paper products and transportation equipment industries did not exhibit
any overtime-productivity relationship, while companies in the fabricated metals industry
(which exhibited similar overtime and work hour trends compared to paper products and
transportation companies) showed a significant negative relationship. Shepard and
Clifton (2000) note that technology differences as well as the type of work being done
across these industries have the potential to differentially impact employee fatigue, onthe-job stress levels, and the amount of unproductive or idle time, all of which could
explain the inconsistent relationship between overtime hours and productivity.
Vegso et al. (2007) looked at another potential outcome of working overtime in a
manufacturing setting, acute occupational injuries. They leveraged a case-crossover
design, which involves matching cases to themselves at an earlier point in time, to
examine the number of hours employees worked prior to a shift where an injury occurred
as compared to the number of hours worked prior to a non-injury shift. Additionally, they
utilized paired t-tests and conditional logistic regression to evaluate the significance of
the difference between the two instances. Their results showed that there was small, but
highly significant differences between hours worked directly preceding the injury and the
control, which was each employee’s work hours four weeks prior to the injury.
Employees who worked more than 64 hours in the week prior to the shift in which an
injury occurred had an 88% excess risk when compared to those who worked 40 or fewer
hours during the week prior. As a result, Vegso et al. (2007) concluded that controlling
overtime in manufacturing settings may reduce employees’ risk of injury on the job.
Seeking to study overtime outcomes beyond a single industry or occupation,
Dembe et al. (2005) examined responses from 10,793 Americans who participated in the
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National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) from 1987 to 2000. The NLSY was
sponsored by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and targeted a representative sample of
young people living in the United States. The survey collected information on
sociodemographic characteristics, as well as job and employer characteristics including
work hours and incidents of work-related injuries and illnesses. Their study was based on
a theoretical model proposed by Schuster and Rhodes (1985), which posits that overtime
and long work hours impact employees’ risk of workplace accidents by precipitating the
intermediary conditions of drowsiness, fatigue, and stress. The pathway that links a
demanding work schedule with these intermediary conditions and ultimately to an
accident can be mediated by various personal (e.g., age, gender, health status), job
(e.g., hazards, work intensity), and organizational (e.g., overtime policy, amount of
supervision) factors.
Dembe et al.’s (2005) results showed that jobs with an overtime schedule were
linked to a 61% higher injury hazard rate as compared to jobs with no overtime and that
working at least 60 hours per week was associated with a 23% higher hazard rate. Even
more, a clear trend was evident, whereby the injury rate increased as the number of hours
per day (beyond 8) and week (beyond 40) increased. Nonetheless, this study, as well as
those previously discussed, cannot be used to infer that a causal relationship exists
between overtime and negative outcomes.
However, one experimental study was conducted by Fang et al. (2015) that does
offer support for a causal relationship between fatigue, (a possible outcome of long work
hours; the relationship between work hours and fatigue is discussed below) and safety
performance in construction workers. In this study, ten participants were required to
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complete the task of transporting heavy materials across a 10-meter distance, which
included a risky area intended to mimic the risks construction workers must navigate
during a standard workday. The risky area was designed to measure two types of errors:
(1) perception, which required participants to visually discriminate between two light
signals indicating either a safe or hazardous step, and (2) motor control, which required
participants to avoid areas signaled as hazardous.
The researchers designed the task to test if participants could identify and
correctly respond to potential hazards while performing a physically demanding activity,
and each participant was required to complete the task 200 times. Participants’ fatigue
level was measured via self-report using the Fatigue Assessment Scale for Construction
Workers (FASCW), which includes three dimensions (physical inactiveness, mental
fatigue, and discomfort). After every 50 trials, participants completed the FASCW and
their error rate was calculated. This enabled four different pairs of fatigue-error data to be
collected for each participant. To assess performance under a range of different fatigue
levels, participants were required to complete the experiment task on two separate days
— once after a half day of normal work, and once after a full day of normal work.
Afterwards, the researchers interviewed each participant.
Results indicated that throughout the experiment, participants’ fatigue levels
ranged from 12 to 38, while error rates ranged from 4% to 38%. To determine if average
error rates significantly differed under varying levels of fatigue, t-tests were calculated.
When participants’ fatigue levels were below 20, no significant differences appeared;
however, when fatigue levels exceeded 20, there were significant differences between
error rates. As such, Fang et al. (2015) deemed a fatigue level of 20 as the critical point at
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which the impact of fatigue began to emerge. Next, they conducted a linear regression
using all sample data with fatigue levels greater than 20, which produced an R2 value of
.82 and a slope of 1.44%. So, on average, each unit increase in fatigue (beyond 20) was
associated with a 1.44% increase in error rate. Examining each participants’ individual
data, all but one worker’s error rates increased significantly once their fatigue exceeded
20, while changes in error rates were not significant when fatigue was below 20. Fang et
al. (2015) did not discuss how or if participants’ baseline fatigue varied after a half day
compared to a full day of work, nor did they explicitly mention the use of
counterbalancing in their study design. Thus, their study provides limited support for the
causal connection between fatigue and safety in the construction industry.
Regarding the relationship between overtime work and fatigue, previous studies
offer mixed findings (r ranging from .00 to 0.12), showing that working long hours can
sometimes be related to fatigue. Beckers (2008) suggests these findings could be due to
range restriction in both overtime and fatigue levels, as well as failure to account for the
quality and type of overtime work. She also suggests that in cases of high-quality
overtime, working additional hours can be fun and therefore have positive outcomes (e.g.,
increased motivation and job satisfaction).
As previously discussed, researchers such as Harma (2003) and van der Hulst
(2003) argue that overtime can create an imbalance between the effort employees expend
at work and the amount of time they have to recover from work, as overtime requires not
only additional effort investment at work, but also results in less recovery time (Meijman
& Mulder, 1998). This theoretical model is supported by the research of Dahlgren et al.
(2006), who conducted a within-person experimental field study with sixteen white-collar
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workers. Participants were exposed to two, counterbalanced conditions: a standard
workweek (i.e., 8 hours per day, 40 hours total) or an overtime workweek (i.e., 12 hours
per day, 60 hours total). During the extra four hours per day in the overtime condition,
participants were instructed to perform their normal tasks, so that workload and stress
levels remained consistent between the two conditions. They were also asked to maintain
the same sleep schedules throughout both conditions.
Throughout the study, participants underwent extensive surveying and testing.
Every morning, participants completed a sleep diary and answered a variety of questions
about their sleep quality the previous night. At six points throughout each day of the
experiment, participants made self-ratings on their current feelings of stress and
sleepiness. At the end of each workday, participants answered additional questions
regarding their feelings of tension, irritation, exhaustion, sense of time pressure, ease of
thinking, and ability to recuperate throughout the day. They were also asked to rate their
workload, pace of work, and satisfaction with their work performance, as well as indicate
the activities they did after work (e.g., caring for children or relatives, housework, leisure
activities, watching television, rest or sleep).
Results indicated that during the overtime condition, participants reported greater
feelings of exhaustion, irritation, and difficulty thinking, and they experienced less
sufficient recuperation. Additionally, participants reported less sleep, more fatigue
symptoms, and increased sleepiness at the end of the week in the overtime condition as
compared to the regular workweek condition. While Dahlgren et al. (2006) could not
determine if participants’ increased fatigue and sleepiness resulted from overtime hours
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alone or decreased sleep, previous research does support an association between long
work hours and sleep deprivation (e.g., Kageyama et al., 2001; Liu & Tanaka, 2002).
Åkerstedt et al. (2002) also studied the relationship between overtime and fatigue.
They examined a Swedish sample of 58,000 working individuals and found that fatigue
was significantly predicted by both overtime work (measured as more than 50 hours per
week) and physically strenuous work. In another field survey study, Park et al. (2001)
examined fatigue complaints and work hours across a sample of 238 male engineers
working in South Korea. Park et al. (2001) used an ANCOVA to compare three different
groups of participants: those working fewer than 60 hours per week, those working
between 60 and 70 hours weekly, and those working more than 70 hours per week, while
controlling for age. Their results showed that drowsiness and dullness differed
significantly across all three groups, with participants who worked more than 70 hours
per week reporting the highest levels of drowsiness and dullness. It should be noted,
however, that the additional dimensions of fatigue they examined did not differ
significantly across the three work hour groups.
In another field study, Proctor et al. (1996) examined the relationship between
overtime, cognitive performance (via a series of neuropsychological tests), and fatigue in
248 hourly employees at a fuel-injector manufacturing plant. Of this sample, 66% of
participants worked some overtime during the week prior to testing; 28.6% worked more
than 8 hours of overtime, and 9.3% worked more than 20 hours of overtime (i.e., more
than 60 hours that week). First, Proctor et al. (1996) compared cognitive performance
across employees who worked overtime (i.e., any hours over 40) in the week before
testing versus those who did not work any overtime in the prior week. The overtime
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group scored significantly lower than the no-overtime group on 63% (15 of 24) of the
cognitive tasks. Additionally, they leveraged a series of multiple regressions to examine
the relationship between overtime and a variety of outcome variables. After controlling
for demographic characteristics (including gender, age, education, repeated grade in
school) and work characteristics (including job type, shift worked, number of consecutive
days worked prior to test day, number of hours worked on the test day prior to testing,
acute petroleum naphtha exposure), results showed that overtime was negatively
associated with scores on tests of attention and executive function, as well as greater
ratings of fatigue.
Wong et al. (2019) conducted the most recent meta-analysis on the topic of long
work hours and occupational health, which included 46 studies spanning 814,084
employees across 13 countries. Their analysis produced an overall odds ratio of 1.245
(95% CI: 1.195-1.298) between long working hours and occupational health, with their
category of related health producing the strongest odds ratio (1.465, 95% CI: 1.3321.611); this category included sleep disturbance, short sleep duration, sleep problems,
exhaustion, and injuries. While these results do suggest that a negative relationship exists
between long work hours and employee health, this is a relatively small effect, as an odds
ratio of 1.68 is equivalent to a Cohen’s d of 0.2 (Chen et al., 2010). This meta-analysis
also identified four moderators: health measure (longer hours associated with greater risk
of cardiovascular heart diseases, metabolic syndrome, fatigue, injury, poor sleep quality,
short sleep duration, sleep disturbance); cut-point for long hours (significantly higher
health risks when working more than 50 hours per week or 10 hours per day); study
method (stronger negative relationship for case-control studies versus cross-sectional
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studies); and country of origin (strongest negative relationship in China). Wong et al.’s
(2019) meta-analysis did not consider employees’ prior medical history, preexisting
medical conditions, or any other individual employee characteristics beyond gender. As
noted by Allen et al. (2007), this is a critical component of understanding the true
relationship between working hours and employee outcomes. This may also explain why
Wong et al. (2019) found a relatively small odds ratio.
In summary, research to-date suggests that the relationship between working long
hours and employee outcomes is more complex than it appears. The majority of research
findings on the topic do not employ rigorous enough methodology to infer causality,
though there is theoretical support for causal pathways through which long hours could
negatively impact employees (Harma, 2003; van der Hulst, 2003) as well as empirical
support that fatigue can indeed cause more frequent mistakes on the job (Fang et al.,
2015) and that fatigue can be a product of overtime work (Dahlgren et al., 2006).
Correlational research shows that long work hours, especially beyond 50 hours per week,
is often related to negative health and safety outcomes for some employees, but
individual demographics such as age and prior health status can moderate this
relationship (Allen et al., 2007), as can characteristics such as job type, industry, and
even workplace technology (Shepard & Clifton, 2000).
Motivation to Work Long Hours
Another important topic to address in the study of overtime is why employees
make the decision to work long hours in the first place. In the mid-twentieth century,
economists noticed a somewhat abrupt halt in the steady decline of hours worked by the
average American employee; around 1970, the number of working hours began to rise
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(Schor, 1991). While some researchers suggest this increase in hours occurred as a result
of employers’ power to require additional work from their employees (e.g., Schor, 1991),
George (1997) argues that modern marketing and advertising tactics could be to blame, as
Americans need additional income to support their desire to purchase more and more
products. Others, however, have noted that the notion of American consumerism and/or
materialism causing longer work hours is not supported by the available data. Feldman
(2002), for example, notes that many of the managers who are working high amounts of
overtime can already afford the luxuries they want. Furthermore, if working long hours
was motivated exclusively by economic need, we would see employees with more
children working longer hours than those without, yet the relationship between hours
worked and family size is not strong (Filer et al., 1996; Schor, 1991).
To explore why some managers work long hours, Feldman (2002) constructed a
theoretical framework consisting of individual-level, job-level, organizational-level, and
economic-level factors that explain when and why managers choose to work long hours.
At the individual level, Feldman suggests that employees’ tendency to work long hours
varies across demographic and personality factors (i.e., males, those who are single, those
without children, those in the breadwinner role, those with high self-monitoring
tendencies, those without hobbies/leisure activities, and those with higher levels of
conscientiousness and achievement motivation are likely to work longer hours).
With respect to the job itself, Feldman (2002) proposes that managers whose
work outputs are less visible/tangible are likely to work more hours, as are those in jobs
with less specific appraisal criteria and those who are evaluated on contextual rather than
task-specific performance. Feldman also suggests that managers whose work is more
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intrinsically rewarding work more hours. Schedule, working conditions, and
telecommuting opportunities also play a role. Finally, the organizational factors that can
result in managers working longer hours include leadership support of long
hours/overtime, strong organizational norms and expectations of working long hours, a
cultural perception of time as monochronic (i.e., viewing time as a fixed, measurable
commodity), and even economic pressures such as competition with other organizations,
declining profits, and the threat of layoffs.
Like Feldman (2002), Lambooij et al. (2007) argue that the relationship between
employee and employer is characterized by more than finances and economic principles.
While time and money may be the most obvious components of the relationship,
Lambooij et al. (2007) argue that a social exchange relationship also exists and that this
relationship is governed by the exchange of social goods such as cooperation, time,
effort, career prospects, and social capital. For example, in exchange for an employee’s
time, in the form of working long hours, the employer may provide the employee with
better career prospects, in the form of a special assignment or promotion (Lambooij et al.,
2007).
The concept of a social exchange relationship, as well as the monetary benefits
discussed by George (1997), are both evident in the research of Goldenhar et al. (2003),
who conducted focus groups with construction workers in the United States. Throughout
the discussion of why these employees choose to work overtime hours, three primary
themes emerged: expectations of management, long-term career prospects, and money.
Management expectations and career potential point to the existence of a social exchange
relationship (Lambooij et al., 2007), while monetary gains point to employees’ desires to
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fund new cars, vacations, even gifts for their children – all of which point to modern
consumerism and the success of marketing and advertising practices noted by George
(1997). In summary, available research suggests that employees are motivated to work
long work hours and/or overtime hours for a variety of reasons, and the choice to work
more is not always strictly monetary in nature.

Present Study
The data for this applied dissertation are from a large, US-based manufacturing
company. The company’s Supply Chain leadership team (which oversees manufacturing)
was considering a company-wide reduction in the number of voluntary overtime hours
that manufacturing employees were permitted to work in a given week. At the time of
this project, all hourly employees could work unlimited overtime hours. Some members
of the Supply Chain leadership team wanted to better understand the relationship between
overtime and various metrics including absenteeism, downtime, quality holds (i.e.,
product deficiencies), workplace accidents, and dollar amount of workers’ compensation
claims. Specifically, they wanted to understand if locations with employees working a lot
of overtime performed worse on these metrics, which would support the implementation
of a policy limiting the total number of hours employees could work each week.
The Vice President of Human Resources (HR) for the Supply Chain function
approached the company’s internal talent analytics team – composed of one I-O
Psychology PhD practitioner, one I-O Psychology MA, ABD practitioner, and one
Master of Human Resources practitioner – to help with this work. A project team was
formed, consisting of the talent analytics team, several subject matter experts
( specifically, engineers who worked at various manufacturing facilities across the
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country and were very familiar with day-to-day operations and the nature and nuances of
plant data/metrics), and HR leaders in the Supply Chain function.
As discussed by Rynes et al. (2002), a number of contextual factors can impact
how or if research is conducted in organizations. In this case, as the team started working
on the project, several challenges became apparent: data quality and availability, the
company’s lack of ability/willingness to conduct research, and significant time
constraints. The team recognized that they could provide some insight about overtime,
but the ability to meticulously research the true causal impact of overtime would require
experimental methodology, substantial data extraction and cleaning, advanced modeling
techniques, and the most precious and limited resource of all, time. Time limitations were
arguably the most influential constraint, as budgetary meetings were set to occur within
the next month, and Supply Chain leadership needed to know whether to set aside funds
to hire additional hourly headcount, which would be necessary if an overtime-reduction
policy was enacted.
After a series of conversations with the project team, it became apparent that the
HR Vice President who originally commissioned this work was the stakeholder most
willing to slow down and leverage data-driven insights before making the decision to
enact an overtime policy; the majority of stakeholders (i.e., business leaders) did not
believe it was necessary to examine the available data before making a decision and were
very much comfortable relying on anecdotal evidence alone. Their lack of interest in
examining the available data prior to implementing the policy was likely due to three
primary factors: (a) the company’s overarching culture, which values quick, agile
decision-making and action over slow, careful deliberation and inaction; (b) anecdotal
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evidence, gut feelings, and/or company narratives suggesting that due to the demanding
nature of working in a manufacturing plant, allowing employees to work more than 60
hours per week could be dangerous; and (c) the messiness of (and therefore lack of trust
in) the Supply Chain function’s data, especially at a national level. With this context in
mind, the project team decided on an analysis plan that required less data extraction and
cleaning, as well as significantly less time and methodological rigor: using a median split
to assign plants to high- and low-overtime groups and then comparing the two groups’
mean performance on several important business metrics.
This applied dissertation describes that methodology including how the data were
aggregated, analyzed, and examined. It is worth noting that the original analyses did not
involve any statistical tests; instead, mean values were compared based on practical
significance. This approach was chosen because it made the results simple to explain to
stakeholders, who were able to evaluate mean differences based on practical importance
and financial implications and were less concerned with evaluating the statistical
significance of these differences. Many researchers have discussed the shortcomings of
an overreliance on statistical significance (e.g., Amrhein et al., 2019; Hurlbert et al.,
2019) and instead advocate for “a more holistic view of the evidence that includes the
consideration of … related prior evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and
data quality, real world costs and benefits, novelty of findings, and other factors that vary
by research domain” (McShane et al., 2019, p. 238); however, these researchers do not
recommend entirely abandoning the use of statistics as was done in this project. As such,
after briefly summarizing the original work done by the project team, the same data will
be statistically examined and interpreted through a scientific lens. These results will be
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compared with the original team’s findings, and the project work will be evaluated and
discussed in the broader context of the science-practice gap, including how and why
internal I-O practitioners often make different methodological decisions than their
research-scientist counterparts.

CHAPTER 2
ORIGINAL PROJECT SUMMARY
Participants
The study’s sample consisted of twenty-nine manufacturing plants based in the
United States that employ approximately 16,700 hourly employees.

Procedure
Because two of the five outcome metrics, downtime and destroyed quality holds,
cannot be broken out by department, all analyses were conducted at the plant level. Data
were extracted by a subject matter expert (SME), an engineer highly familiar with Supply
Chain data and the various systems and software used to record and store important plant
metrics. Before examining any of the plant metrics, the company’s 29 plant locations
were classified into one of two groups: high or low overtime (OT). This classification
method was selected primarily for its simplicity – the Supply Chain leadership team
already recognized that plant locations differed on the amount of overtime worked, so
breaking them out into two groups offered a simple method of comparison. Furthermore,
this type of analysis was quick and easy to explain to others, both of which were
important to the project’s stakeholders.
To determine whether each plant would be assigned to the high- or low-overtime
group, the team used company logs of the number of hours each employee worked per
week in 2018. These logs along with total headcount at each plant were used to assign
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each plant an overtime percentage, referred to as its overtime (OT) utilization. This OT
utilization percentage indicates the average proportion of a plant’s total headcount that is
spending 50% or more of the year working more than 60 hours per week.
To calculate a plant’s overtime utilization, the number of employees at each plant
who worked more than 60 hours per week for at least 6 weeks in each quarter (50% of the
time) in 2018 were counted. The decision to use a threshold of 60 hours per week (rather
than 40, which would be considered standard overtime) was guided by the company’s
proposed policy, which would limit overtime to no more than 20 hours in a week (i.e., a
maximum of 60 hours worked each week). Next, the data across the four quarters were
used to calculate the average number of employees that worked 60 or more hours per
week, for at least six weeks per quarter, in 2018. Finally, this number was divided by the
total headcount at that plant.
It is important to note that the team felt that this methodology would allow each
plant’s population size, which varied substantially across the 29 plant locations, to be
taken into account; instead of just looking at total hours worked at each plant, this
analysis identified the percentage of total headcount that was working overtime, as well
spread of overtime (i.e., whether a plant has many people working over 60 hours
consistently or just a few people working very high hours and driving plant total hours
up). This allowed the team to identify plants that had a high percentage of their plant
population working overtime hours consistently – these are the high-overtime plants. See
Table 1 for an example of how each plant’s overtime utilization was derived.
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Table 1
Calculation of Plant X’s 60-Hour Overtime Utilization
# Employees per Quarter Working >60
Hours/Week 6 or More Weeks
(Q1) 22

(Q2) 15

(Q3) 11

(Q4) 11

2018
Avg.

Total
Headcount

60-Hr OT
Utilization

15

300

5%

Next, the 29 plants were divided into two categories based on their OT utilization.
Plants whose OT utilization fell below the median were assigned to the low-overtime
group, while those whose OT utilization fell above the median were assigned to the highovertime group (see Table 2). A median-split approach, common in applied research
(Altman & Royston, 2006), was selected for its simplicity, as it enabled quick and easy
comparison across two groups.

Table 2
Median Split of Low- and High-Overtime Plants
Low OT Plants
Plant
OT Utilization

High OT Plants
Plant
OT Utilization

ST
CAN
WO
WV
BE
WI
YO
MO
KIL
FRC
PU
FRE
CAS
OR

CU
KIR
RO
JO
PE
SA
AB
KE
FA
TO
DE
CHA
LY
VA
IR

0.34%
0.76%
0.77%
0.82%
0.85%
0.88%
0.88%
1.03%
1.11%
1.13%
1.38%
1.41%
1.58%
1.85%

1.88%
1.92%
2.16%
2.47%
2.61%
2.66%
2.97%
2.98%
3.41%
3.49%
3.72%
3.87%
4.36%
6.31%
6.94%
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Finally, the two groups were compared across several important metrics:
absenteeism, downtime, quality holds (i.e., product deficiencies), workplace accidents,
and dollar amount of workers’ compensation claims.
Measures
Absenteeism. Absenteeism data indicated the total number of hours employees
were absent from work in 2018, by plant. To control for the population size of each plant,
the total number of absent hours was divided by each plant’s total headcount. This
number was then divided by eight (an estimate of the average number of hours in a
workday), to represent each plant’s average number of absent days per employee.
Downtime. Downtime is the percentage of time, based on total operating hours,
that a plant’s manufacturing processes are not fully operating. Downtime can be planned
(i.e., scheduled) in the case of shift changes or routine sanitation, or it can be unplanned
(i.e., not scheduled) in the case of machinery malfunction or employee errors. In this
study, downtime was measured as each location’s total downtime percentage in 2018. In
addition to raw downtime percentage, a financial estimate of the cost of downtime was
also utilized. This metric will be explained in greater detail when the results of the
downtime hypotheses are presented.
Destroyed Quality Holds. Quality holds occur when a product is flagged as not
meeting the company’s quality standards. These products are pulled off the line and
manually examined in order to determine if they can still go to market (i.e., there is a
minor flaw) or if they must be discarded (i.e., there is a severe flaw that deems the
product unsellable). The company labels these severe flaws or defects as destroyed
quality holds. In this study, destroyed quality holds were measured as each location’s
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total number of destroyed quality holds in 2018, divided by total headcount to control for
each plant’s population size.
Workplace Accidents. Employees are required to report all workplace accidents,
regardless of severity. Details of each accident are stored in a company-wide database
and routinely monitored by the company’s Health and Safety team. In this study,
workplace accidents were measured as each location’s total number of workplace
accidents recorded in 2018, divided by the total headcount to control for each plant’s
population size.
Workers’ Compensation Claims. Workers’ compensation claims are paid out to
employees who have been injured on the job to cover the medical costs associated with
their injury. In this study, workers’ compensation claims were measured as each
location’s total dollar amount of claims paid out to injured employees in 2018, divided by
the total headcount to control for each plant’s population size.
Hypotheses
The project team hypothesized that locations with higher overtime would have a
greater number of fatigued employees due to the higher number of hours they were
working. Fatigued employees could be more likely to make errors while working on the
production line, which could result in increased downtime and increased quality holds at
high-overtime locations. While previous research does suggest that working long hours is
related to greater fatigue (e.g., Åkerstedt et al., 2002; Dahlgren et al., 2006; Park et al.,
2001; Rosa, 1995; van der Hulst, 2003), as well as lower productivity (e.g., Shepard &
Clifton, 2000) and cognitive performance (Proctor et al., 1996), there is a lack of
published research that explicitly discusses relationships with manufacturing downtime
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and quality holds, perhaps due to their proprietary nature and/or businesses’
unwillingness to publish research on them. Therefore, the first two hypotheses were
based primarily on the project team’s own observations and business knowledge rather
than published empirical research. It should be noted that this is somewhat commonplace
in applied research, as hypotheses are often formed inductively based on organizational
knowledge (e.g., Aguinis, 1993; Daft, 1983).
Hypothesis 1. High-overtime plants will experience more downtime than lowovertime plants.
Hypothesis 2. High-overtime plants will have a higher number of destroyed
quality holds than low-overtime plants.
Fatigued employees are more likely to be injured on the job (Dembe et al., 2005;
Fang et al., 2015; Folkard & Tucker, 2003; Schuster & Rhodes, 1985; Swaen et al., 2003;
Vegso et al., 2007), potentially leading to over 50% of employees filing workers’
compensation claims to cover costs associated with their accident (Shannon & Lowe,
2002).
Hypothesis 3. High-overtime plants will have a higher number of workplace
accidents than low-overtime plants.
Hypothesis 4. High-overtime plants will have higher dollar amounts of workers’
compensation claims than low-overtime plants.
Finally, the project team hypothesized that high-overtime plants would have more
absenteeism as compared to low-overtime plants. This trend is supported by Ose (2005),
who found that overtime has a positive relationship with the frequency of short-term
absences.
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Hypothesis 5. High-overtime plants will exhibit higher employee absenteeism
than low-overtime plants.
Results
As shown in Table 3, downtime was lower for plants in the low-overtime group (x̅
= 6.32%) as compared to the high-overtime group (x̅ = 7.00%). While this difference of
less than 1% between the low- versus high-overtime groups was not statistically
examined and may seem small, the financial impact provides a starker contrast. The
project team was given access to financial estimates (i.e., a cost-of-downtime metric) by
Supply Chain SMEs within the company to monetize this difference, suggesting that the
< 1% difference across the two groups costs over $3,000,000. This cost implication
occurs because when a product line is down (i.e., not operating), the business is unable to
produce and subsequently sell and thus profit from new product.

Table 3
Performance Across Low- and High-Overtime Groups

Avg. OT Utilization
Avg. Downtime
Est. Cost of Downtime
Avg. Destroyed Quality Holds
Avg. Number of Accidents
Avg. Workers’ Compensation
Avg. Number of Absences

Low OT Plants

High OT Plants

1.06%
6.32%
$28,831,462.27
36,479.26
9.29
$103,585.17
29.17 days

3.45%
7.00%
$31,950,721.26
53,596.90
16.08
$309,632.25
30.36 days

Concerning the Hypothesis 2, the average number of destroyed quality holds was
lower for plants in the low-overtime group (x̅ = 36,479.26) as compared to plants in the
high-overtime group (x̅ = 53,596.90). This suggests that product deficiencies are more
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frequent and more severe in plants with a higher proportion of employees working
overtime.
Regarding Hypotheses 3 and 4, low-overtime plants exhibited fewer accidents (x̅
= 9.29) as compared to plants in the high-overtime group (x̅ = 16.08). Workers’
compensation costs follow the same trend; plants in the low-overtime groups paid out
fewer dollars (x̅ = $103,585.17) as compared to plants in the high-overtime group (x̅ =
$309,632.25).
Finally, the results concerning Hypothesis 5 showed that high-overtime plants
averaged about one additional day of absenteeism as compared to low-overtime plants
(low-overtime x̅ = 29.17 days; high-overtime x̅ = 30.36 days). While this comparison was
not examined statistically, the project team expected to see a larger difference in the
average number of absent days between the two overtime groups and therefore
considered Hypothesis 5 as only partially supported.

Business Outcome
These results were compiled, visualized in a PowerPoint deck, and presented to
the project stakeholders. The project team emphasized the non-causal nature of the
results, which prompted discussion about other potential drivers of plant performance
including managerial quality, plant culture, and even the age and functioning of various
pieces of machinery in a given plant. Although the project team was unable to conclude
that overtime was the cause of differing levels of performance across high- versus lowovertime groups, stakeholders were impressed by the overarching trend showing that
plants with a higher proportion of employees working overtime had poorer performance
(i.e., higher downtime, more destroyed quality holds, more accidents, greater workers’
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compensation claim amounts, and more absenteeism) across the business metrics
examined. As such, the leadership team decided to invest in additional headcount and
enact a policy that permitted hourly manufacturing employees to work a maximum of 60
work per week.

CHAPTER 3
POST HOC ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Procedure
The team’s decision to use a median split to transform continuous data into
categorical/dichotomous data (high- versus low-overtime groups), while simple and
commonly done in applied research (see Altman & Royston, 2006), has clear drawbacks.
The richness of the data was lost, and the variability within the high and low groups was
discarded (Austin & Brunner, 2004; Cohen, 1983). Furthermore, as Hunter and Schmidt
(1990) explain, correlations between an artificially dichotomized independent variable
and any dependent variables of interest will systematically understate the true correlation
by 20%, assuming the underlying relationship is linear. Kelley and Preacher (2012) go as
far as to say this practice is “almost always inappropriate to do” (p. 146). So, although a
t-test would most closely replicate the original analysis conducted by the project team, a
series of bivariate regressions (where the predictor variable is overtime utilization) allows
us to utilize the overtime variability that exists across plants in order to better understand
the relationship between overtime utilization and the outcome metrics.
Additionally, when available, financial metrics were leveraged instead of
performance metrics so that results could be interpreted through the lens of the
company’s bottom line. This methodology offers greater insight than a t-test, as it enables
stakeholders to understand the level of financial risk associated with an overtime
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reduction policy, rather than comparing performance across two, artificially defined high- and
low-overtime groups. A third methodological improvement for this analysis was the addition of
department-level metrics, where available. The original analyses were conducted only at the
plant level to maintain consistency across outcome metrics, as two of the five metrics, downtime
and destroyed quality holds, cannot be broken out by department. Each plant contains two
primary departments: manufacturing and warehouse. As such, department-level metrics provide
a larger sample size (n = 58) and subsequently more power. Note that when department-level
breakdowns are available, plant-level regressions will still be conducted and interpreted so that a
viable comparison with the original analysis is possible.
Financial Implications
If the company limits the number of hours employees can work each week and wants to
maintain the same operational schedule and production as was achieved prior to an overtimereduction policy being in place, it will need to invest in additional headcount (i.e., hire new
employees). While it is certainly possible to avoid hiring additional headcount by requiring
current employees who work less than 60 hours per week to work more hours, Supply Chain
leadership did not pursue this option based on HR and Legal advisement. A review of the
company’s 2018 payroll records indicated that roughly 232,000 hours beyond 60 per week were
worked across all hourly manufacturing employees that year. As such, in the presence of a
maximum overtime policy limiting hours to no more than 60 per week, additional work hours
(and employees to work them) would be required.
To hire new employees, the company incurs a number of costs including recruiting,
screening, training, and insurance/benefits. Using an upper-end estimate of 232,000 hours to
calculate these costs, it is projected that the company would need to hire an additional 108
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employees, which costs roughly $7.7 million based on available estimates of recruiting,
screening, hourly pay, insurance/benefits, and training. However, enacting an overtime-reduction
policy would also result in cost savings, because the company would no longer have to pay any
employee for working above 60 hours per week. Based on the amount of overtime worked in
2018, this could result in about $3 million in savings. So, when considering the implications of
enacting an overtime-reduction policy, $4.7 million (a $7.7 million investment minus potential
savings of $3 millions) represents a rough estimate of the break-even point. In other words, if the
company can recoup that cost by reducing downtime, destroyed quality holds (i.e., product
deficiencies that are so severe that the product is discarded and never brought to market),
absenteeism, accidents, and workers’ compensation claims, then the cost incurred by reducing
overtime would pay for itself.
It should be noted that this monetary break-even point, while a helpful tool to evaluate
the results of these ad-hoc regression analyses, was not discussed by the original project team
because the primary stakeholders (i.e., Supply Chain leadership) were well aware that their
proposed overtime-reduction policy would require some investment. However, the ability to
provide stakeholders with a sense of how financially risky the policy implementation clearly
would have been a value-add to the original project. Furthermore, evidence suggesting the
company would actually profit from the policy would serve as additional support for its
implementation.
Leveraging Confidence Intervals to Examine Level of Risk
By looking at the range of estimates across three different confidence intervals (95%,
85%, 75%), we can better understand how much financial risk the company could incur by
implementing an overtime-reduction policy. While these three intervals are arbitrary, they enable
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a quick comparison across different ranges of the certainty of financial risk. In this way, they will
not serve as dichotomous indicators of statistical significance, but rather reflect confidence
intervals as a fluid risk indicator of the potential error in the point estimates.
While the vast majority of social science research (including applied research) uses a
threshold of α = .05, thus reflecting a 95% confidence interval (Miller & Ulrich, 2019), this
threshold makes Type I Errors less likely and Type II Errors more likely (Rice & Trafimow,
2010; Wuensch, 1994). As noted by McShane et al. (2019), the tradeoff between Type I and
Type II Errors “should depend on the costs, benefits, and probabilities of all outcomes which in
turn depend on the problem at hand and which vary tremendously across studies and domains”
(p. 238). When trying to develop and test a new scientific theory, setting α at 0.05 or even 0.01
may be justified, as this is a case where a Type I Error is more harmful than a Type II Error.
However, in other contexts such as airbag testing or life-saving drug development, committing a
Type II Error can be much more serious and more dangerous than committing a Type I Error. In
an article titled How many people have to die over a type II error? Rice and Trafimow (2010)
discuss precisely this dilemma, illustrating how often Type II Errors can occur and the impact
this can have on applied research.
Clearly the present study presents less risk than airbag testing or life-saving drug
development, but it is likewise an instance in which committing a Type II Error (i.e., incorrectly
concluding there is no relationship between overtime and work accidents) is more harmful than a
Type I error, as, previous experimental research has demonstrated that overtime can result in
fatigue (Dahlgren et al., 2006), which may make accidents more likely (Fang et al., 2015).
Making a Type I Error in this situation (i.e., concluding there is a relationship between working
overtime and accidents even though no relationship actually exists) may be far less harmful than
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making a Type II Error (i.e., concluding there is not a relationship between working overtime
and accidents when there actually is a relationship). While there is potential that tenured
employees will be frustrated by a newly imposed overtime policy (because it will limit the
amount of overtime pay they can earn ) and therefore choose to leave the company, previous
research does not suggest there are negative health consequences of working fewer than 60 hours
per week (i.e., still permitting 20 hours of overtime); however, some research does suggest that
working fewer than 40 hours per week is negatively related to employee mental health (Allen et
al., 2007). Given the context presented above, it is reasonable to examine confidence intervals as
a fluid indicator of risk.
Results
Assumptions
Prior to conducting any analyses, all assumptions required for bivariate linear regression
were evaluated: linearity, homoscedasticity, independence of errors, residual normality, and
absence of outliers. Outliers were identified as any data point with a standardized residual greater
than ± 3 standard deviations. Within this project’s dataset, the likelihood of an outlier being a
legitimate, accurate value or a data-entry error depends on the source from which the data
originated. For example, the company’s mechanisms for recording employee absenteeism,
accidents, and workers’ compensation claims are dependent on employee record keeping, vary
significantly by location, and are not validated at a national level. As such, absenteeism,
accident, and workers’ compensation outliers are likely to be erroneous data points and therefore
should be removed from the analysis (Iglewicz & Hoaglin, 1993; Osborne & Overbay, 2004).
Downtime, on the other hand, is a meticulously tracked, electronically-measured metric with
national processes in place to ensure accuracy and consistency in reporting across plants. As a

49
result, downtime outliers are very likely accurate, legitimate values that should not be removed.
Decisions regarding outliers will be presented in more detail when the results of each hypothesis
are discussed.
Residual normality was assessed by inspecting a normal probability plot (i.e., a Normal
P-P Plot) of the standardized residuals. Some plots exhibited minor departures from the line of
best fit, which will be presented and discussed with the results of each hypothesis. The
homoscedasticity assumption was met for all variables, assessed via inspection of a scatter plot
of the standardized residual values against the standardized predicted values. Finally, the
independence of errors assumption was tested by examining the Durbin-Watson value; all values
were near 2, suggesting this assumption was met.
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis posited that downtime would be significantly higher in the highovertime group compared to the low-overtime group. A bivariate linear regression was
conducted to test this hypothesis, with overtime utilization as the predictor variable and each
plant’s downtime cost as the outcome variable. Supply Chain SMEs provided the team with an
estimate that one hour of downtime was equivalent to $10,000 in lost product, which enabled a
conversion of downtime percent to the cost incurred as a result of that downtime. Downtime
costs the company money because when a line is down (i.e., not operational), product cannot be
produced and therefore cannot be sold to customers. As such, the company loses sales as a result
of downtime. By using this cost-of-downtime estimate instead of raw downtime, the regression
coefficient and confidence intervals can serve as a means of examining the company’s risk of
financial loss based on the strength of the relationship between overtime utilization and
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downtime. No outliers were detected for this hypothesis, and all other assumptions were met (see
Figures 1-2).

Figure 1: Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual for H1

Figure 2: Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted Values for H1
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Results showed R2 = 0.09, Adjusted R2 = 0.05, and B = $4,841.03, β = 0.30, which
suggests overtime utilization accounts for roughly 9% of the variance in downtime costs.
Additionally, by decreasing overtime utilization by 1%, the company may save $4,841 (via
decreased downtime, assuming that the causal connection hypothesized is indeed the source of
the downtime). In order to better understand the relationship between overtime and downtime
costs, 2018 headcount and hours data were used to estimate the average number of employees at
each plant who would need to reduce their hours to fewer than 60 per week in order to observe a
1% decrease in overtime utilization. The result was about five employees, and so the beta value
can be interpreted as follows: for every five employees who reduce their hours to fewer than 60
per week, the company may save $4,841. Company data indicates that 1,285 employees worked
over 60 hours per week at least 50% of the time in 2018. If these 1,285 employees could work
only 60 hours per week, as would be the case if an overtime reduction policy was enacted, this
regression model suggests that the potential cost savings of the subsequent reduced downtime
could total $1,244,145.
However, this dollar amount is based on a single sample with only 29 data points that
represent the average cost downtime across an entire year. By examining the confidence interval
of B, we can better understand the range of potential monetary outcomes that might occur if we
were to repeat the study with a very large sample. Further, by examining three different levels of
confidence (i.e., 95%, 85%, 75%), we can examine varying levels of financial risk. As shown in
Table 4, the risk of losing money as a result of enacting a maximum-overtime policy is likely
minimal; even in the most conservative 95% CI, the upper range is far larger than the lower
range, suggesting there are more favorable odds that the company will save versus lose money.
The less conservative 85% and 75% CIs indicate virtually no risk of losing money.
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Table 4
Confidence Intervals for Hypothesis 1
CI
for B

CI
Lower Bound

CI
Upper Bound

Policy Impact
Lower Bound

Policy Impact
Upper Bound

95%
85%
75%

-$1,337
$379
$1,301

$11,019
$9,303
$8,381

-$343,709
$97,503
$334,347

$2,831,999
$2,390,784
$2,153,943

As compared to the original project findings, which leveraged the same cost-of-downtime
estimates and estimated potential savings of about $3 million (based on reducing the average
downtime of all plants in the high-overtime group to the same amount of downtime reported by
plants in the low-overtime group), this ad-hoc analysis suggest savings may be lower, at only
$1.2 million.
Hypothesis 2
Next, the team hypothesized that high-overtime plants would have a higher number of
destroyed quality holds (i.e., product deficiencies so severe that the product cannot be brought to
market and instead must be thrown away/destroyed) than low-overtime plants. Using each
plant’s estimated cost of production, a financial metric representing the total dollar amount lost
as a result of destroyed quality holds was calculated. This metric was divided by each plant’s
total headcount to control for the size of the plant. A bivariate linear regression was conducted to
test this hypothesis, with each plant’s 60-hour overtime utilization as the predictor variable and
each plant’s cost of destroyed quality holds per person as the outcome variable. No outliers were
detected for this hypothesis, and one case was removed due to missing data (this location uses
different software to track quality holds, so the national database did not include their counts).
While the assumptions of linearity, independence of errors, and homoscedasticity were met, the
Normal P-P plot shows some deviation from the line of best fit (see Figures 3-4). Note that if
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residual normality is the only assumption violated in linear regression, the resulting coefficients
will remain consistent and unbiased (Ernst & Albers, 2017; Williams et al., 2013).

Figure 3: Normal P-P Plot for H2

Figure 4: Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted Values for H2
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The analysis resulted in R2 = .13, Adjusted R2 = .09, and B = $7.03, β = .35, which
suggests overtime utilization accounts for roughly 13% of the variance in the cost of destroyed
quality holds. Because this regression analysis used cost of destroyed quality holds per person to
control for the different population sizes across the plants, the B value of $7.03 represents only a
per-person estimate. To create a plant-level estimate and extrapolate the overall policy impact,
this B value must be multiplied by the number of employees at each plant regularly working
more than 60 hours per week – this number was calculated by multiplying each plant’s overtime
utilization by its total headcount. This calculation provides a per-plant estimate of the potential
cost savings that might result from an overtime-reduction policy because, in theory, each plant
would have zero employees working over 60 hours per week once the policy is enacted.
Summing this number across all plants, which provides us with an estimate of the policy impact
across all plants, suggests a potential cost savings of $225,839. Again, three different confidence
intervals were examined (see Table 5), which suggest the company’s risk of losing money as a
result of decreasing overtime utilization is acceptable.

Table 5
Confidence Intervals for Hypothesis 2
CI
for B
95%
85%
75%

CI Lower Bound
Per Person
-$.47
$2
$3

CI Upper Bound
Per Person
$15
$12
$11

Policy Impact
Lower Bound
-$15,099
$52,043
$88,023

Policy Impact
Upper Bound
$466,455
$399,635
$363,655

The amount of projected savings provides a very conservative estimate, because it
represents only the cost of discarded raw materials and does not take into account the loss of
profit that occurs because these destroyed products are never brought to market, nor does it
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account for the employee wages paid by the company to produce product that is ultimately
discarded. Unfortunately, the project team did not have access to this type of information. These
regression results are consistent with the original project’s estimate of $226,000 in cost savings
due to decreased destroyed quality holds.
Hypotheses 3-4
Next, the team hypothesized that high-overtime plants would have more accidents and
higher workers’ compensation claim amounts (i.e., dollars paid out to employees who have been
injured on the job to cover the medical costs associated with their injury) compared to lowovertime plants. Due to the low frequency of accidents, only the relationship between overtime
and workers’ compensation claims, which are the direct result of workplace accidents, will be
examined. This metric was divided by each plant’s total headcount to control for the size of the
plant. Because workers’ compensation can be broken down to the department level (n = 58), two
regressions were used to examine the relationship between overtime and workers’ compensation:
(1) each plant’s overtime utilization predicting each plant’s workers’ compensation claim
amount; and (2) each department’s overtime utilization predicting each department’s workers’
compensation claim amount.
Plant-level analysis. No outliers were detected for the plant-level analysis. The
assumptions of linearity, independence of errors, and homoscedasticity were met, but the Normal
P-P Plot shows some questionable characteristics; however, it does generally follow the line of
best fit (see Figures 5-6). Note that if residual normality is the only assumption violated in linear
regression, the resulting coefficients will remain consistent and unbiased (Ernst & Albers, 2017;
Williams et al., 2013).
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Figure 5: Normal P-P Plot for H3-4 (Plant-Level)

Figure 6: Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted Values for H3-4
(Plant-Level)
The regression results were R2 = 0.08, Adjusted R2 = 0.04, and B = $52.00, β = 0.27. This
suggests that overtime utilization accounts for roughly 8% of the variance in workers’
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compensation claims and that for every 1% decrease in overtime utilization, the company may
save $52 in paid-out workers’ compensation claims. Using the same policy-impact calculation
that was applied for Hypothesis 2, a per-plant estimate of projected savings that could occur as a
result of reducing overtime utilization to zero was calculated. This calculation suggests that
across all plants, a total of $1,831,125 in paid-out workers’ compensation claims could be saved,
with each plant potentially saving an average of $63,142 per year. These results are consistent
with previous literature showing that fatigued employees are more likely to be injured on the job
(Folkard & Tucker, 2003; Swaen et al., 2003; Vegso et al., 2007) and subsequently more likely
to seek worker’s compensation from the company. Again, three confidence intervals were
examined (see Table 6).

Table 6
Confidence Intervals for Hypotheses 3-4: Plant-Level Analysis
CI
for B
95%
85%
75%

CI
Lower Bound
-$20
-$.24
$11

CI
Upper Bound
$124
$104
$93

Policy Impact
Lower Bound
-$653,423
-$7,710
$338,919

Policy Impact
Upper Bound
$3,994,101
$3,348,389
$3,001,760

These confidence intervals suggest greater odds of the company earning money versus
losing it, though unlike the CIs of the prior two hypotheses, both the 95% and 85% suggest that
the company could lose money. However, the upper ranges remain far larger than the lower
ranges. As such, the overall financial risk appears to be relatively low. As compared to the
original project findings, which estimated that about $2.9 million could be saved in workers’
compensation costs if accidents were reduced, this post-hoc analysis suggests lower cost savings
of only $1.8 million.
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Department-Level Analysis
Each plant has two primary departments, manufacturing and warehouse, and workers’
compensation records indicate the department employees were working in when the accident
occurred. These records were used to create a department-level dataset, which indicated the total
dollar amount of workers’ compensation claims within each plant’s two primary departments
(n = 58). Before running the regression, each department’s overtime utilization, which is based
on the number of hours worked by each employee within a department, was converted into a zscore to check for outliers. While raw hours records are very likely accurate (due to the Finance
team ensuring workers are accurately paid based on the number of hours they worked), there are
known data quality errors in the company’s records of which department employees work in.
Therefore, overtime utilization outliers at the department level are likely erroneous values that
should be removed from the analysis (Iglewicz & Hoaglin, 1993; Osborne & Overbay, 2004).
One department with very high overtime was identified (overtime utilization = 13.72%, z = 4.63)
and removed from all department-level analyses (i.e., workers’ compensation and absenteeism).
For the department-level workers’ compensation regression, all assumptions were met
(see Figures 7-8). Four worker’s compensation outliers were identified with standardized
residuals of 5.50, 3.70, 3.58, and 3.30. As previously discussed, workers’ compensation outliers
are very likely erroneous values that should be removed from the analysis (Iglewicz & Hoaglin,
1993; Osborne & Overbay, 2004), because the company’s mechanisms for recording workers’
compensation claims are dependent on employee record keeping, vary significantly by location,
and are not validated at a national level. Removal of these outliers produced a larger R2 value
(0.01 to 0.09).
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Figure 7: Normal P-P Plot for H3-4 (Department-Level)

Figure 8: Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted Values for H3-4
(Department-Level)
Results were R2 = 0.09, Adjusted R2 = 0.08, and B = $46.24, β = 0.31. This suggests that,
at the department level, overtime utilization accounts for roughly 9% of the variance in workers’
compensation claims and that a 1% decrease in a department’s overtime utilization may result in
that department saving $46.24 in paid out workers’ compensation claims per year. Using a
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per-department calculation to extrapolate the policy impact across the entire company, it was
estimated that this decision could result in a total of $1,268,487 in savings. The confidence
intervals displayed in Table 7 suggest very little risk of the company losing money as a result of
decreasing overtime, even at the most conservative 95% CI.

Table 7
Confidence Intervals for Hypotheses 3-4: Department-Level Analysis
CI
for B

CI
Lower Bound

CI
Upper Bound

Policy Impact
Lower Bound

Policy Impact
Upper Bound

95%

$6

$87

$153,349

$2,383,626

85%

$17

$76

$456,480

$2,080,220

75%

$23

$70

$621,899

$1,914,801

In summary, plant- and department-level results for workers’ compensation were largely
consistent, with the department-level model explaining similar estimates of variance (R2 = 0.09)
compared to the plant-level model (R2 = 0.08).
Hypothesis 5
Finally, the project team hypothesized that high-overtime plants would have more
absenteeism as compared to low-overtime plants. Absenteeism data are available at the
department level, so two bivariate linear regressions were run to test this Hypothesis: (1) each
plant’s overtime utilization predicting each plant’s number of absences; and (2) each
department’s overtime utilization predicting each department’s number of absences. The team
did not have access to a financial metric for absenteeism, so only raw absences were examined.
Each plant’s total number of absent days was divided by total headcount, as a means to control
for the size of the plant.
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Plant-Level Analysis
One outlier was detected for this analysis, with a standardized residual of 4.05; As
previously explained, absenteeism outliers are very likely erroneous values that should be
removed from the analysis (Iglewicz & Hoaglin, 1993; Osborne & Overbay, 2004), because the
company’s mechanisms for tracking employee absenteeism are dependent on employee record
keeping, vary significantly by location, and are not validated at a national level. Removal of this
outlier did not substantially alter the R2 value (0.02 to 0.01). All assumptions were met (see
Figures 9-10).

Figure 9: Normal P-P Plot for H5 (Plant-Level)
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Figure 10: Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted Values for H5
(Plant-Level)
Results were R2 = 0.01, Adjusted R2 = -0.03, B = -.42, β = -0.11. This suggests that, at the
plant level, overtime utilization explains less than 1% of the variance in absenteeism. The
negative B value, though small, suggests that absenteeism may increase as overtime utilization
decreases. Because this regression analysis used absent days per person to control for the
different population sizes across the plants, a policy impact calculation is necessary to
extrapolate the potential company-wide impact. Again, three confidence intervals were examined
(see Table 8).
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Table 8
Confidence Intervals for Hypothesis 5: Plant-Level Analysis
CI
for B

CI
Lower Bound

CI
Upper Bound

Policy Impact
Lower Bound

Policy Impact
Upper Bound

95%

-2.01

1.16

-$63,365.25

$36,569.00

85%

-1.57

0.72

-$49,494.25

$22,698.00

75%

-1.33

0.49

-$41,928.25

$15,741.25

These confidence intervals are much wider than the CIs produced by the prior analyses.
They also show the greater odds that absenteeism will increase versus decrease if an overtimereduction policy were enacted. However, previous research and theory (e.g., Ose, 2005) do not
support a negative relationship between overtime and employee absenteeism. Moreover, there
are known data-quality issues with how absenteeism is tracked across plants in this organization.
With all of this in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that there is not a meaningful relationship
between overtime utilization and absenteeism and that these results reflect messy data rather than
a true negative relationship between overtime and absenteeism.
Department-Level Analysis
One department did not have absenteeism data, so it was removed from the analysis.
Additionally, outlier analyses identified one outlier with a standardized residual of -3.08. Its
removal did not substantially alter the R2 value (.01 to .00). The assumptions of linearity,
residual normality, and independence of errors were met (see Figure 11), however the scatterplot
of standardized residuals versus standardized predicted values exhibits some heteroscedasticity
(see Figure 12). Both logarithmic and square root transformations were applied, but the resulting
scatterplots did not show marked improvement (see Figures 13-14). Ernst and Albers (2017) note
that when heteroscedasticity is the only violation present, the regression coefficients will remain
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consistent and unbiased; nonetheless, the resulting confidence intervals should be interpreted
with caution.

Figure 11: Normal P-P Plot for H5 (Department-Level)

Figure 12: Original Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted Values for
H5 (Department-Level)
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Figure 13: Log Transformation Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized Predicted
Values for H5 (Department-Level)

Figure 14: Square Root Transformation Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals vs. Standardized
Predicted Values for H5 (Department-Level)
The results were R2 < 0.01, Adjusted R2 = -0.02, B = -.06, β = -0.02, which suggests
overtime utilization does not explain any of the variance in employee absenteeism. In other
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words, there is not a meaningful relationship between the two variables. Again, policy impact
was calculated, and three confidence intervals were examined (see Table 9).

Table 9
Confidence Intervals for Hypothesis 5: Department-Level Analysis
CI
for B

CI
Lower Bound

CI
Upper Bound

Policy Impact
Lower Bound

Policy Impact
Upper Bound

95%
85%
75%

-1.13
-0.84
-0.68

1.01
0.72
0.56

-$32,976.43
-$24,513.45
-$19,844.22

$29,474.51
$21,011.53
$16,342.30

Despite the additional power offered by the larger sample size of this analysis as
compared to the plant-level analysis, the regression output and CIs are similar. This offers
additional support for a lack of meaningful relationship between overtime utilization and
absenteeism in this sample.
As shown in Table 10, the results across all hypotheses can be combined to estimate the
company’s odds of breaking even on the investment needed to enact an overtime reduction
policy allowing employees to work a maximum of 60 hours per week. With a break-even point
of $4.7 million, point-estimate results indicate the company may only recoup about $3.3 million
of the 4.7 million in costs associated with the policy.

H1: Downtime
H2: Quality Holds
H4: Workers’
Comp.
Total

95% CI
Lower Bound
-$343,709
-$15,099
-$653,423
-$1,012,230

B
Estimate
$1,244,145
$225,839
$1,831,125
$3,301,109

$7,292,555

$2,831,999
$466,455
$3,994,101

95% CI
Upper Bound

Cost Implications for Enactment of Overtime Reduction Policy

Table 10

$141,836

$97,503
$52,043
-$7,710

85% CI
Lower Bound

$6,138,807

$2,390,784
$399,635
$3,348,389

85% CI
Upper Bound

$761,288

$334,347
$88,023
$338,919

75% CI
Lower Bound

$5,519,358

$2,153,943
$363,655
$3,001,760

75% CI
Upper Bound
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
This study examined two very different approaches to understanding the
relationship between overtime and a variety of outcome variables. One approach was a
back-of-the-napkin analysis, methodologically imperfect and fairly basic (i.e., using a
median split and visually comparing means), which some may associate with a
practitioner problem-solving model; the other was more thoughtful, more
methodologically sound, and leveraged a more complex statistical analysis (i.e., bivariate
regression). These approaches not only produced different results (i.e., the more rigorous
post-hoc analysis projected lower cost savings), but they also provided very different
levels of information and insight. Both sets of analyses were underpowered, but the posthoc analysis allowed us to understand the level of error introduced by the lack of power,
while the original analysis completely failed to address it.
Furthermore, the transformation of confidence intervals into dollar amounts
offered meaningful insights about the potential financial outcomes of an overtimereduction policy, which would have allowed stakeholders to make a more informed
decision about an overtime reduction policy. This practice allows practitioners to
translate statistical analyses into meaningful financial metrics, which stakeholders can
clearly understand and articulate. Ultimately, although it can be tempting to dismiss the
methodologically rigorous scientific approach when working in an applied setting, this
68
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comparison exercise revealed a number of lessons that internal I-O practitioners can
benefit from when tasked with answering business questions.

More Data Points Are Better than Fewer Data Points
Though this must be balanced with time constraints and related costs, I-O
practitioners should seek to acquire as many meaningful data points as possible when
beginning a project. This will allow them to derive more meaningful statistical insights
about relationships between variables of interest, which they can share with stakeholders
to aid them in effective decision making.
Leveraging the right organizational data is key to accurately answering virtually
any business question that arises. In this example, the project team received annual
averages of each plant’s performance across five key metrics. Person-level data across
time would have been the preferred choice and would have allowed a better
understanding of the distributions within each plant/department, as well as the seasonality
of the business. In addition, monthly or even quarterly averages may have provided
deeper insights regarding variation across time without requiring significant additional
time or expense related to the analysis. At the very least, the project team should have
requested standard deviations along with each plant’s mean performance.

Confidence Intervals Are a Useful Tool for Decision-Making
When making data-driven business decisions, confidence intervals can be
particularly informative. They enable us to understand how much uncertainty is present
in our point estimates, which is incredibly important when dealing with messy
organizational data, so that we can gauge how close they are to the true population
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parameter. When transformed into financial metrics, as was done in this project,
confidence intervals can offer valuable clarity about the level of uncertainty of economic
risk. Furthermore, the contextual inspection of confidence intervals can be particularly
useful when taking into consideration the circumstantial elements related to the decision
at hand (e.g., costs and benefits of the decision, magnitude of the decision’s impact).
However, as noted by McShane et al. (2019), it’s important to also take into account
things like “related prior evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and data
quality, real world costs and benefits, novelty of finding, and other factors that vary by
research domain” (p. 235) when interpreting statistical results.

Do Not Forget About Outliers
Outliers have the potential to powerfully shape the outcomes of any analysis;
failing to determine if outliers are present can compromise the results derived from those
data (García-Pérez, 2012). As such, if outliers are detected, the next step is to determine
their legitimacy. Removing outliers that are erroneous (e.g., data entry errors, machinery
malfunctions) makes sense, but choosing to retain or remove legitimate outliers requires
thoughtful consideration (Iglewicz & Hoaglin, 1993; Osborne & Overbay, 2004).
Practitioners must be informed about the sources of their data and whether those sources
are reliable and valid. If they are not, data quality will likely suffer.
Outlier identification is relatively simple to do, plus it is easy to explain to
stakeholders who do not have a background in statistics. Even if practitioners decide to
forego testing other assumptions, which might be common (Hoekstra et al., 2012) but is
strongly discouraged (e.g., Choi, 2005; Vardeman & Morris, 2003), testing for outliers
should not be dismissed, even in a fast-paced, applied setting.
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Conclusion
This applied dissertation presented an opportunity to examine the role of the
scientist-practitioner gap in organizational decision making, while also evaluating how
results differed between a back-of -the-napkin analysis versus a more scientific,
methodologically rigorous approach. The more rigorous approach produced richer
insights regarding how risky the decision to enact an overtime-reduction policy might be
from a financial perspective and exemplified the value of leveraging confidence intervals
to guide organizational decision making.
While many I-Os, especially those who work as internal practitioners, may
eschew the rigors of a more scientific approach, this dissertation demonstrates the value
of combining scientific rigor with the contextual knowledge of an applied approach to
organizational decision-making. Bridging the scientist-practitioner gap may require that
both parties understand their inherent limitations – scientists performing studies in
applied settings must better understand the importance of contextual information related
to their results, as the results provided by organizational data must be interpreted through
a contextual lens that is developed from business acumen achieved through experience in
the organization under study. Practitioners, on the other hand, need to adopt methods that
lead to better methodology and cleaner data when possible. Though many organizations
are developing metrics and systems that result in more accurate data, both anecdotal and
empirical evidence indicate that poor data quality plagues many organizations (Tee et al.,
2007). This can make insightful, high-quality organizational research that much more
challenging to accomplish, as is evidenced by this project. The present study shines a
light on how organizations might benefit from the investment in better data and better
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analytics. In today’s world where there is a growing reliance on information technologies,
I-O practitioners have the opportunity to bring additional insights to bear on important
organizational decisions.
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